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Abstract 
 
Concerns over human rights violations in Turkey by the European Union (EU) 
have hindered the Republic of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Freedom of expression has 
been denied through a number of laws since the creation of the Republic in 1923. This 
thesis presents how and why speech has been constrained in Turkey, and it provides an 
argument that Ottoman history has a direct impact on the country’s politics today. It also 
examines the implications of legislation that has been applied to silence individuals 
addressing controversial issues in public. In particular, Article 301 of the Turkish Penal 
Code has been one of the main laws used to punish those who speak of granting more 
rights to minorities. Hundreds of scholars have been prosecuted under Article 301, and 
this paper looks into a few noteworthy cases to portray the impact that this law has had 
on Turkish society. In recent years, there have been a number of legislative reforms 
carried out in the country to bring Turkish laws in line with European law; however, there 
is still much work to be done to improve Turkey’s human rights record and acquire EU 
membership.   
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Part I: Introduction 
 
The suppression of freedom of expression is a serious human rights violation, 
condemned internationally under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. When the Republic 
of Turkey was established in 1923, its leaders wished to create a democratic state with 
Western ideology. However, freedom of speech was constrained based on various articles 
in the Turkish Constitution, especially since the military regime of 1980-1983. Article 
159 to the Turkish Penal Code states:  
 
Those who publicly insult or deride the moral character of Turkishness, the 
Republic, the Grand National Assembly [Turkish Parliament] or the Government, 
or the Ministries, the military or security forces of the State or the moral character 
of the judiciary, shall be punished by between one and six years of severe 
imprisonment.
1
  
 
The suppression of speech is based on the idea that the security of the state is to 
be safeguarded, especially from the threat of Armenian, Greek, and Kurdish nationalists. 
In the case of Armenians, Turkey has continuously denied that the massacres of 1.5 
million Armenians in 1915-1923 by the Ottoman government constituted genocide, a fact 
that is widely accepted by various scholars throughout the world as the first major 
genocide of the twentieth century. Furthermore, Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus 
has caused hostilities with Greece, and a peaceful conflict resolution is yet to be reached. 
Lastly, ethnic Kurds in eastern Turkey have been fighting for decades to gain autonomy 
and create their own state, which is a direct threat to the territorial integrity of the 
Republic of Turkey. Thus, open debate, especially about these three issues, is thought to 
                                                 
1
 William Hale, “Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process,” Turkish Studies, 
Vol. 4, No. 1, (Spring 2003): 111. 
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endanger national security, and the need to limit people’s rights has led to state 
censorship.  
The text of Article 159 to the Turkish Penal Code was amended in 2002 as part of 
a harmonization package to bring Turkish laws in line with the European Union’s 
requirements and, in return, be granted a EU membership. As the accession process to the 
European Union became a reality in 2002, Turkey enacted a number of reforms; 
nonetheless, freedom of expression was not fully granted. Coming into effect on June 1, 
2005, Article 301 to the Turkish Penal Code made it a crime to insult “Turkishness.” 
Although vague, “Turkishness” means the Republic of Turkey, Turkish ethnicity, or 
Turkish governmental institutions. Even though the wording of the old article was 
modified, the contents of the previous provisions remained in the new code.  
 Since its introduction, Article 301 has been criticized by local and international 
human rights advocates for its abuse of free speech. Dozens of scholars, journalists, and 
writers have been charged with insulting Turkishness and have faced jail time. Even 
though many have been acquitted, not all have been lucky as seen in the case of Turkish-
Armenian newspaper editor Hrant Dink, who was shot and killed in front of his office in 
Istanbul by a 17-year-old boy.
2
 The prominent cases of Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink, Taner 
Akçam, and Ragip Zarakolu have exposed this human right violation globally and have 
led to criticism and calls to amend the Turkish Penal Code. 
The European Union pressured the Turkish government to amend Article 301 in 
2008 following the assassination of Hrant Dink. Although the amendment lowered the 
                                                 
2
 Maureen Freely, “Why They Killed Hrant Dink,” Index on Censorship, No. 36, (February 2007): 15.  
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prison sentence and made it a requirement to gain permission of the Justice Ministry to 
file a criminal case, the reforms did not lift restrains on freedom of speech and press. In 
2011, there was a wave of arrests of prominent Turkish scholars, which sparked more 
international outrage; thus, the Turkish government was pressured once again to amend 
its penal code. New judicial reforms were passed in early 2012, but Article 301 was not 
affected, and it is highly unlikely that it will be abolished anytime soon. Thus, this thesis 
addresses why freedom of expression was constrained in the Republic of Turkey, and 
what the effects of Article 301 have been since 2005. It also looks at history to explain 
how certain events have influenced politics today. This thesis further discusses the 
alleged role and power of the deep state. Finally, it examines freedom of speech in the 
global context, since this issue impacts the international community as a whole.  
 
Methodology 
 
The qualitative method has been used to conduct research for this paper. The 
study relies on primary and secondary sources - books, journals, newspaper articles, and 
historical analysis. These sources contributed to an enhanced understanding of the issue. 
Publications by nongovernmental organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, were useful in gaining access to coverage of the high profile cases 
in Turkey that brought this issue to the attention of the international community. 
Additionally, the study examines the text of Article 301 and scholarly publications that 
untangle the reality behind this article. All findings in the paper derive from academic 
sources and news reports.  
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The first section looks at Turkey’s history with its human rights violations, and in 
particular, the Armenian and Kurdish issues. This has a direct impact on today’s social 
and political condition in Turkey. Since the government claims that there was no 
genocide, those who argue against this rhetoric threaten the national unity and security of 
Turkey. Additionally, the Kurdish struggle for independence is also a national security 
question. Those supporting the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and advocating for 
Kurdish rights are seen as traitors by the Turkish government and prosecuted under 
Article 301.  
The following section discusses legislation implemented after the 1982 
Constitution and how this affected free speech. One of the pieces of legislation was 
Article 159, which eventually became Article 301 in 2005. It is imperative to understand 
that Article 301 is not the only provision in the penal code that constrains speech. There 
are a number of other articles to the Turkish Penal Code that make it punishable by law to 
criticize the president, the prime minister, the military, and the judicial systems. 
Additionally, this section will discuss the amendments to Article 301 in 2008.  
The next section reviews literature that addresses the political motivations behind 
Article 301 and its effects on Turkish society. It identifies the reason for the enactment of 
legislation constraining freedom of expression. This section also explores theory of free 
speech in general. It discusses whether this freedom is an absolute right or not. Should 
people be allowed to say whatever they please, or should there be limits to free speech in 
certain aspects? 
The next part of this research focuses on four case studies of Turkish scholars 
prosecuted under Article 301. Since the primarily concentration of this thesis is on the 
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Turkish government’s censorship of the Armenian Genocide, those scholars were chosen 
who have been indicted for daring to utter the word “genocide.” Thus, the discussion will 
center on the cases of Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink, Taner Akçam, and Ragip Zarakolu. 
The last section discusses and reflects on freedom of speech in Turkey, as well as 
in the global context. In the analysis of Turkey, this paper examines Turkey’s deep state, 
which is believed to be the force behind the government that rules the country. Some 
scholars believe that the military, in order to retain power, has curtailed people’s basic 
rights, and freedom of expression has been affected as a consequence. The next step in 
this section is to look at the potential changes to the Turkish Penal Code. Although the 
amendments to the penal code in February 2012 did not change laws pertaining to 
freedom of speech, the debate following human rights activists’ arrests in October 2011 
and the constant pressure by the European Union for the abolition of Article 301 makes 
one hope that Turkey will allow more freedoms to its citizens through the new 
constitution it is currently drafting.  The last section also discusses Turkey’s power over 
the United States government. The Republic of Turkey is not only censoring its own 
public, but it obstructs the U.S. government’s efforts to recognize the Armenian 
Genocide. Additionally, Turkey has threatened to severe relations with European nations 
which recognize the genocide.  
The paper ends with recommendations for future research. With the ongoing 
changes to Turkish law and the refusal by the government to alter those laws pertaining 
to freedom of expression, it would be interesting to see whether Turkey will reach its goal 
in becoming a member of the EU or choose an alternate route and become a regional and 
even global power independently. 
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Part II: Background Information 
Brief History of the Armenian Genocide and the Kurdish Issue 
 
April 24, 1915. This date marks the beginning of the Armenian Genocide. Of the 
nearly two million Armenians living within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire before 
1914, only half a million survived the genocide. Although the Armenian population of 
the Ottoman Empire was previously harassed, overtaxed, and subject to pogroms, the 
genocide was implemented to rid Turkey once and for all of its Armenian problem.  
 The Ottoman Empire was experiencing a military, administrative, and economic 
decline at the end of the seventeenth century. Taking advantage of a week Ottoman 
military, the Russian Empire pursued a policy of expanding its territory westward 
towards the Black Sea. By the end of the eighteenth century, nationalist sentiments were 
on the rise in the Balkans; the Balkan people welcomed these territorial advances and 
believed that with Russian help they would be liberated from Turkish control.
3
 This led to 
Balkan and Greek uprisings in the nineteenth century. The sultan’s sovereignty declined, 
and the Ottoman Empire suffered territorial losses. In an attempt to halt further nationalist 
movements within the empire, Sultan Abdülmecid I implemented a series of reforms that 
sought to modernize the Ottoman Empire. Spanning from 1839 to 1878, the reform 
movement is called Tanzimat.
4
 This attempt to integrate Muslims and non-Muslims into 
the Ottoman society and promote equality did not yield any positive results for the 
Armenians, but instead it increased the resentment towards the Christian minority, whom 
the Muslims could not accept as their equal. The Armenian population of the empire 
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 Hagop Barsoumian, “The Eastern Question and the Tanzimat Era,” in The Armenian People from Ancient 
to Modern Times, Volume II: Foreign Domination to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth 
Century, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, 175-201. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 178. 
4
 Barsoumian, 180.  
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was heavily taxed, regarded as second-class citizens, and did not have equal rights in 
Muslim courts.  
By the late 1870s, Christian minorities in the Balkans demanded autonomy; the 
Armenian population, on the other hand, only asked for security and remained loyal to 
the Ottoman government, except in a few isolated locations. By the time Armenians 
demanded social, economic, and political reforms, the Ottoman Empire was defeated in 
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and lost its western territories, which prompted 
paranoia among Turks that Armenians would follow in the footsteps of the Balkan 
Christians and seek security from the Russia Empire.
 5
 Ottoman control over the Balkans 
ended with the Treaty of San Stefano, which also gave the Russian Empire the Armenian-
populated districts of Alashkert, Ardahan, Batum, Bayazid, and Kars.
6
 Alarmed by 
Russian expansion of authority, the Great Powers of Europe (Great Britain, France, 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) forced the Russian Empire to give back territory it 
took under its control during the war, and in return, they promised to guarantee the 
security of Armenians. Nevertheless, when the Russian troops pulled back from Bayazid 
and Alashkert, a massacre of Armenians took place in Alashkert by the Kurds; 
Armenians realized that they were on their own.
7
 Small Armenian groups emerged in the 
1880s that started secret meetings and shooting practices, which made the sultan become 
even more fearful that the Armenians would call for autonomy and the empire would 
collapse.  
                                                 
5
 Richard G. Hovannisian, “The Armenian Questions in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1914,” in The 
Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II: Foreign Domination to Statehood: The 
Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, 203-238. (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2004), 206.  
6
 Hovannisian, 208.  
7
 Hovannisian, 210.  
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The 1890s are described as a decade of “demonstration, confrontation, revolt and 
massacre.”8 Sultan Abdülhamid II ordered Kurdish paramilitaries to raid Armenian 
churches, schools, shops, and homes in search of weapons. Even when no weapons were 
discovered, Armenians were attacked and provoked to rebel. In October 1895, nearly two 
thousand Armenians gathered in Constantinople to petition for their civil liberties and 
demand the sultan to curtail the power of the Kurdish paramilitaries. However, this led to 
a violent police intervention and a massacre. The clash in Constantinople was followed 
by purges in the Armenian-populated provinces of Bitlis, Diyarbekir, Erzerum, Harput, 
Sivas, Trabizon, and Van. These became known as the Hamidian massacres of 1895-
1896. Thousands (some argue the number is close to 300,000) lost their lives, and others 
were forced to convert to Islam. Thus, “the twenty-five-year process of eliminating the 
Armenians of the Ottoman Empire had begun.”9  
 The Young Turks came to power in 1908 and brought new hopes for equality; 
however, the Young Turk regime’s plan was far from that. The First Balkan War of 
1912-1913 between the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia) and 
the Ottoman Empire led to Turkish loss of territory. Ottoman leaders were fearful that 
with European help other minority groups would soon start an uprising. Thus, in April 
1909, Armenians of Adana were attacked and massacred, which is considered to be a 
prelude to the 1915 events. Conditions worsened for the Armenian population of the 
Ottoman Empire, and in February 1915, the men enlisted in the army were disarmed and 
ordered to perform manual labor. Armenians were forced to give up their weapons, which 
they were legally permitted to hold as a self-protection method against the Kurds. 
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9
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During this process, Armenian men were jailed, interrogated, and tortured.
10
 They were 
later deported and killed within the first few days of the genocide. As the question of men 
was solved, the next stage was the mass deportation of the elderly, women, and children. 
Between April and August 1915, Armenians from all over the empire were forced to 
leave their homes and all of their belongings behind and march towards the Syrian 
Desert. They marched without food or water, frequently were attacked by Kurdish 
bandits, and the prettiest girls were raped or taken to the harems. Although there were 
some Turks who tried to help Armenians by providing shelter or taking in the children 
and raising them as their own, nobody was able to stop the inevitable from happening. 
World War I had created the perfect conditions for the genocidal plan of the 
Young Turks. Although the blueprint of the genocide may have been drafted before the 
war, as Europe became engulfed in bloody warfare, the extermination of the Armenian 
population of the Ottoman Empire was the least of their concerns.
11
 The genocide was 
well documented by eyewitnesses, foreign officials, and missionaries who sent word 
about atrocities committed against Armenians. The American Committee for Armenian 
and Syrian Relief was founded in 1915 to save the survivors of the genocide.
12
 If not for 
the humanitarian aid from the United States and Europe, the Armenian population of the 
Ottoman Empire would completely perish.  
 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, while addressing 
the Turkish Parliament on April 24, 1920, called the events of 1915 “shameful acts” and 
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 Christopher J. Walker, “World War I and the Armenian Genocide,” in The Armenian People from 
Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II: Foreign Domination to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the 
Twentieth Century, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, 239-273. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 246.  
11
 Richard G. Hovannisian, “Wartime Radicalization or Premeditated Continuum?” in The Armenian 
Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, 3-17. (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2007), 5.   
12
 Near East Relief and Armenian Genocide. http://www.armenian-genocide.org/ner.html.  
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demanded to punish genocide perpetrators who had fled to Germany at the time. 
However, as the Treaty of Sèvres threatened to allocate Ottoman territory to different 
nations and create an independent Armenia, Mustafa Kemal changed his rhetoric and 
called for the halt of the “senseless” death sentences against former Ottoman leaders.13    
To this day, the Republic of Turkey has failed to recognize the killings of 1.5 million 
Armenians in the last years of the Ottoman Empire as genocide. The reasons and 
motivations behind the deportations and massacres of 1915-1916 differ in the Turkish 
version of history, which tries to conceal the fact that it was a premeditated attack against 
a population that served as a scapegoat for Turkey.
14
 Loss to the Russian army in WWI 
was blamed on the Armenians, who were said to have conspired against the Ottoman 
Empire. This was used as an excuse to deport Armenian populations living close to the 
border with the Russian Empire. However, no explanation was given as to why those 
Armenians living in the westernmost areas of the Ottoman Empire were also deported. 
The massacres of 1915-1923 are not the only turbulent events in that period of the 
Turkish history. The other issue concerns the Kurdish rebellions since the 1920s.   
 Although historically Kurds coexisted peacefully with Turks during the years of 
the Ottoman Empire, they were repressed and struggled to maintain their identity. When 
public manifestation of Kurdish identity was outlawed by Mustafa Kemal, Kurds 
organized a revolt in 1925, which ended with Kurdish defeat. Following the 1925 
Kurdish Revolt, the use of the Kurdish language in publications and education, as well as 
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 Taner Akçam, “Facing History: Denial and the Turkish National Security Concept,” in Confronting 
Genocide, eds. René Provost and Payam Akhavan, 151-157. (Germany: Springer Verlag GmbH, 2011), 
155.  
14
 Nazan Maksudyan, “Walls of Silence: Translating the Armenian Genocide into Turkish and Self-
Censorship,” Critique, Vol. 37, No. 4, (November 2009): 639.  
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the expression of their cultural practices in public were banned by law. The main reason 
behind this was because Mustafa Kemal’s vision was to Westernize Turkey and to create 
a unified Turkish image; a separate Kurdish identity was believed to undermine “national 
unity and integrity” of the country.15 Thus, all Kurdish rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s 
resulted in their defeat and massacres. They were forced to move to eastern Turkey and 
live in the homes vacated by Armenians during the genocide. A martial law was declared 
in the southeast by Mustafa Kemal, lasting until the 1950s, to keep the Kurdish 
population restrained. Additionally, Kosovar Albanians and Assyrians were encouraged 
to resettle in the southeast to change the demographic composition of the region.
16
 The 
Turkish government denied the very existence of Kurds by claiming that they were 
“mountain Turks” and that there was no Kurdish language.17 These efforts by the Turkish 
government, however, did not stop the emergence of Kurdish cultural and national 
awareness in the 1960s.  
The political instability in the country in the 1970s gave rise to the Kurdish 
Workers Party (PKK), internationally recognized as a terrorist group, which fights for an 
independent and united Kurdish state.
18
 The Turkish military state became embroiled in a 
conflict with the PKK for about two decades until the 1999 capture of Abdullah Öcalan, 
PKK’s leader.  In recent years, reforms in the country have expanded minority rights, 
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 Marcie J. Patton, “Turkey’s Tug of War,” Middle East Report, No. 239, (Summer 2006): 44.  
16
 Carl Dahlman, “The Political Geography of Kurdistan,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, No.4, 
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allowing for the usage of the Kurdish language in media and education; however, 
Kurdish nationalism is prohibited, and those speaking out for Kurdish rights are jailed.
19
    
 Since the discussion about the Armenian and Kurdish issues was threatening the 
unity of Turkey, the government adopted a new constitution in 1982, which permitted the 
expression of thought, but at the same time constrained free speech through various 
articles.  As more and more scholars and journalists began to write in support of minority 
rights in Turkey, this issue reached bigger audiences, and the international community 
applied pressure on Turkey to grant basic human rights to its citizens. In spite of this, the 
Turkish government has continued to prosecute those who speak of the Armenian and 
Kurdish issues, and the support for minority rights and free expression of thought has 
become associated with disloyalty and a threat to Turkey’s sovereignty.  
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 Fulton, 27.  
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Trajectory of the Legislative Process 
 
With the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, the Republic of Turkey signed a peace 
agreement with Europe, and its current-day borders were established. The treaty 
recognized Jews, Armenians, and Greeks as minorities and granted them basic rights. 
Kurds, on the other hand, were not accepted as minorities and were not entitled to special 
privileges. The Treaty of Lausanne also gave basic rights to Turkish citizens, but there 
were some constrains to those rights, notably on freedom of expression. Article 159 of 
the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) was primarily used to prosecute individuals for speaking 
about minority rights.
20
 Amended seven times (in 1936, 1938, 1946, 1961, twice in 2002, 
and 2003
21
), Article 159 was replaced by Article 301 in 2005.
22
 However, this did not 
bring about change that the European Union demanded.  
Turkish history in the twentieth century is marked with unstable governments and 
military coups. The final military rule in Turkey (1980-1983) saw the adoption of the 
current constitution, which although on the surface was liberal, constrained the right to 
free speech. Articles 22-26 of the Turkish Constitution permitted free expression of 
thought and opinion. Additionally, the constitution allowed for free and uncensored 
press; however, in the Preamble, it stated that “no protection shall be accorded to 
thoughts and opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the 
indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and 
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moral values or the nationalism, principles and reforms of Atatürk.”23 Moreover, Articles 
158 and 159 made it a crime to “publicly insult or ridicule the moral personality of 
Turkishness, the republic, the Parliament, the Government, State Ministers, the 
military.”24 Other articles limiting free speech were Articles 13 and 14. The original text 
of Article 13 stated that fundamental rights and freedoms could be restricted to preserve 
state territory, national sovereignty and security, and public order. Article 14 added that 
the rights and freedoms embodied in the constitution could not be exercised with the 
purpose of violating the indivisible integrity of the nation and its territory, and 
endangering the existence of the Turkish State and the Republic.
25
 Nevertheless, 
constitutional provisions did not constitute a criminal offence unless the penal code 
allowed those provisions to take effect.  
In particular, the Turkish government’s penal code included Articles 159 and 312 
that were most commonly used to limit free expression of thought and opinion, as well as 
Article 8 of the Law for the Struggle against Terrorism (Law No. 3713). Article 159 of 
the Turkish Penal Code originally states:  
Those who publicly insult or deride the moral character of Turkishness, the 
Republic, the Grand National Assembly [the Turkish parliament] or the 
Government, or the Ministers, the military or security forces of the State or the 
moral character of the judiciary, shall be punished by between one and six years 
of severe imprisonment.
26
 
 
Article 312 forbade anyone to incite public hatred based on race, class, religion, 
or regional difference. It was mainly used to prosecute those who called for greater 
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cultural and political rights for Kurds. Lastly, Article 8 of Law 3713 made it a crime to 
support Kurdish separatism in writing or orally.  
With Turkey’s bid to join the European Union (EU) came legislative and judicial 
reforms. During the Helsinki summit held in December 1999, the EU recognized Turkey 
as an official candidate for accession into the union. However, in order to become a EU 
member, Turkey had to enact a number of reforms to meet the political criteria adopted 
by the EU at a meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993. Compliance with the Copenhagen 
political criteria was a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations. Thus, the 
Turkish legislation had to align with the EU standards in the following areas:  
 
Freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, fight 
against torture practices, trial detention period, training on human rights issues, 
functioning and efficiency of the judiciary, maintenance of de facto moratorium 
on capital punishment, and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish.
27
 
 
Even though the European Council declared Turkey as an official candidate to 
join the union, it would have to meet the Copenhagen political criteria before negotiations 
for its possible accession could start and the conflict with Cyprus over Northern Cyprus 
would be resolved. The United Nations was to negotiate a permanent solution to the 
conflict in Cyprus, which eventually failed in 2004.   
The Turkish government took the first step in the process of aligning Turkish 
legislation with the EU acquis in October 2001 by passing a package of 34 constitutional 
amendments that dealt with freedom of expression, organization and assembly, minority 
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languages, death penalty, and the military’s role in politics.28 In the field of freedom of 
expression, Article 26 was amended, lifting the ban on the use of the Kurdish language in 
public, which had been prohibited by the military regime’s constitution. However, not 
until another harmonization package came into effect in August 2002 did the amendment 
affect the use of the Kurdish language in media and education. Moreover, the Preamble 
of the Constitution was amended, with the words “thoughts or opinions” replaced with 
“actions.” Articles 13 and 14 were also modified, stating that restrictions on fundamental 
rights and freedoms may only be applied by law and should not be in conflict with the 
democratic order of the Republic.
29
 In spite of the reform package, the European 
Commission, which is the executive body of the EU, required further reforms, as it found 
that the October 2001 amendments did not address the fundamental human rights 
problems in Turkey.  
In 2002, the Turkish Parliament followed up the first amendments with three 
other EU harmonization law packages. The European Commission, in its second progress 
report, concluded that the reforms were not sufficient enough to meet the Copenhagen 
political criteria for the following reasons:  
First, the reforms contained a number of restrictions on the full enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Second, the effective implementation of 
reforms has yet to be realized. Third, Turkey needs to make further reforms 
regarding the fight against torture, the civilian control of the military, freedom of 
expression, and compliance with the decisions of the ECHR.
30
  
  
Despite the efforts of the Turkish government to improve Turkish law, Penal 
Code Article 159 and Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law were left unchanged.  Four other 
EU harmonization law packages were adopted in 2003 by the newly elected Justice and 
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Development Party (AKP). It is interesting to note that in 2001, the AKP built its 
electoral campaign around freedom of speech, opinion, and consciousness, and it 
advocated for Turkey’s accession to the EU. In contradiction to this belief, Abdullah Gül 
(AKP Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2003-2007), while a deputy of political Islamist 
Refah (Welfare Party) in 1995, said that when it came to Turkey’s EU membership, 
Turkey was the only party that was supposed to give concessions and nothing was to be 
expected in return from the EU. Thus, he was against Turkey joining the union.
31
 
However, once AKP was in power, its leadership’s stance on joining Europe changed, 
and reforms continued. The biggest improvement the 2003 harmonization law package 
brought was the abolition of Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law.  
Reforms also took place the following year, with Turkey adopting a new penal 
code in September 2004, which went into effect in June 2005. Article 312 was replaced 
by Article 216, which changed the words “incitement to hatred on the basis of differences 
of social class, race, religion sect, or region” to “in a way that may be dangerous for 
public order.”32 This article has been mainly used against journalists writing about the 
Kurdish issue or allegedly denigrating the armed forces. Instead of Article 8 of the Anti-
Terror Law that was abolished in 2003, the new penal code included Article 302, which 
dealt with “separatist propaganda” and “damaging state unity and integrity.”33 Another 
clause in the new penal code that prosecutes individuals based on the expression of their 
thoughts is Article 299, which states that insulting the President of the Republic carries a 
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prison sentence from one to six years.
34
 Aside from these, the article that caused the most 
uproar in Turkey and among the international community was Article 301 to the Turkish 
Penal Code. The original text of Article 301 stated: 
1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey, shall be sentenced a penalty of imprisonment 
for a term of six months to three years.  
2. A person who publicly denigrates the Government of the Republic of Turkey, 
the judicial bodies of the State, the military or security organizations, shall be 
sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years.  
3. Where denigrating of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen in 
another country, the penalty to be imposed shall be increased by one thirds. 
4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime.35 
 
This article was problematic because it was vague and could be applied when a 
person was peacefully expressing opinions in Turkey and even abroad. Thus, it posed a 
direct threat to the fundamental right of freedom of expression ensured by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both of which Turkey has 
signed.
36
 Immediately after coming into effect, writers, journalists, scholars, publishers, 
and human rights activists were prosecuted under Article 301. What brought the 
international community’s attention to this was the high profile case of Orhan Pamuk, a 
well-known novelist and a Nobel Prize winner in Literature, who spoke about the 
Armenian and Kurdish massacres and faced prosecution for his statements. The European 
Union and the United Nations criticized Turkey for suppressing freedom of speech and 
demanded Article 301 to be abolished.  
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The most problematic aspect of this article was not its implementation but the 
content. The term “Turkishness” was very vague and posed a serious concern because 
there was no clear definition of the word. It could mean anything that had to do with 
Turkey or was Turkish. The term could also apply to those who lived outside of Turkey. 
Additionally, while trying cases against “insulting Turkishness,” the court could interpret 
the word anyway it pleased, and the article did not specify if there had to be a clear intent 
to harm the Turkish nation for the person to be prosecuted. Although most individuals 
that were indicted under Article 301 were acquitted, they were publicly harassed and 
many received death threats. The death of newspaper editor Hrant Dink, who had been 
tried under Article 301 for writing about the Armenian Genocide, sparked international 
outrage. Thus, the government of Turkey was pressured once again to amend its Penal 
Code in 2008. The revised text of Article 301 states: 
1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkish Nation, the State of the Republic of 
Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Government of the 
Republic of Turkey of the judicial bodies of the State, shall be sentenced a 
penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and two years.  
2. A person who publicly denigrates the military or security structures shall be 
punishable according to the first paragraph.  
3. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime.  
4. The prosecution under this article shall be subject to the approval of the 
Minster of Justice.
37
 
The most important change in the article was the replacement of the word 
“Turkishness” with the “Turkish Nation” and “State of the Republic of Turkey.” Despite 
the change in wording, the article remains as vague as it was before; this law still 
threatens the right to freedom of expression. The words “publicly denigrate” are also 
ambiguous. The second change to Article 301 reduced the maximum prison sentence to 
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two years. Another noticeable change was that the prison sentence would not be longer if 
the Turkish Nation was insulted by a Turkish citizen living abroad. Lastly, prosecution 
under the law required an approval of the Turkish Ministry of Justice. Therefore, a suit 
could not be filed under Article 301 without an approval from the Minister of Justice. 
This ensured that no arbitrary cases would be brought forward.  
Despite the changes to Article 301, the amendments did not improve freedom of 
speech in Turkey. The 2008 U.S. Department of State’s Human Rights Report criticized 
restrictions on freedom of expression and cited Article 301 as its main concern. The 
European Commission further criticized Turkey in its annual progress report. It was 
concluded that the reforms were not sufficient enough to ensure freedom of speech in the 
country. Furthermore, Turkish officials did not follow up on the constitutional 
amendments and enforce the new law.
38
 Although the Turkish government showed an 
effort with the attempt to bring the law in line with the European Union, it did not fully 
commit itself to strengthening human rights and left provisions that cast a shadow on 
those reforms.   
Another change made by the Turkish Parliament that did not improve civil 
liberties involved the Anti-Terror Law. The revised law increased the power of the 
security forces to fight terrorism, and its aim was to silence people. One of the earliest 
cases was the prosecution of three journalists of Hürriyet Daily News for interviewing 
PKK leaders in northern Iraq.
39
 Today, the Anti-Terror Law is used more often and seems 
to be replacing Article 301 in freedom of expression cases. Since coming into effect in 
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2006, this law has been used to curb Kurdish calls for autonomy and imprison those who 
write about Kurdish civil liberties.  
Articles limiting people’s basic rights in Turkey have caused prosecutions of 
those who express their thoughts freely. The European Court of Human Rights has found 
that from 1959-2011 Turkey was the top violator of the Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which it ratified in 1954. Most cases brought 
against Turkey have involved the right for fair trial, protection of property, and right to 
liberty and security.
40
 The Turkish government has only won 10 percent of cases brought 
against it in the European Court of Human Rights. Despite amendments to the Turkish 
Constitution and the Turkish Penal Code, freedom of expression remains suppressed. The 
amendments in 2008 did not solve the problem; the difference between Article 159 and 
Article 301 is “exclusively phraseological.”41 Although the wording was changed, the 
content remained the same.   
Major reforms were passed in Turkey from 2001 to 2004 that introduced 
important changes to the legislation, but amid the progress, substantial problems still 
remain in Turkey. Freedom of press and speech are not guaranteed, and the Turkish 
security forces continue to use force, torturing and abusing prisoners and protesters. 
Minority groups are still considered second-class citizens; the Armenian, Cypriot, and 
Kurdish issues remain taboo; and people who wish to speak about those subjects are 
silenced through Article 301 and the Anti-Terror Law. Despite these laws and the threat 
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of facing prosecution, many have published newspaper articles and books that address 
Turkish government’s poor human rights record.  
 
23 
 
Part III: Literature Review 
 
 Although the discourse on free speech in Turkey is not a new one, scholars and 
human rights advocates have been engaged in the discussion of this issue more actively 
since the 1990s. As this is an ongoing problem and laws pertaining to freedom of 
expression in Turkey are constantly changing, so must the literature. Further study of this 
issue ought to focus on the new legislative changes and concentrate on other laws that 
violate basic human rights. Currently, most of the research has focused on Article 301; 
however, as the charges brought against individuals under this article have been minimal 
since 2010, the focus should shift to the Anti-Terror Law, which is replacing Article 301 
as a new threat for scholars, journalists, and human rights activists who speak about the 
Armenian, Kurdish, and Cypriot conflicts. This literature review explores the reason for 
the suppression of free speech in Turkey and its effects on society. Furthermore, it 
discusses the theoretical framework of this fundamental right.  
  
Ideology Behind the Suppression of Free Speech 
 
 The main reason the Republic of Turkey has constrained people’s right to freely 
express their thoughts has direct ties to its history. Both Hakan Yilmaz and Taner Akçam 
explain that Turkey’s skepticism of Europe today derives from the memory of Western 
powers dividing up the Ottoman Empire to create an independent Armenia, an 
autonomous Kurdistan, and to ensure Greek presence in the Dardanelles, the Aegean Sea, 
and eastern Thrace.
42
 Thus, talk of Armenian Genocide recognition in Turkey and 
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internationally, as well as the creation of an independent Kurdish state, is out of the 
question. According to Akçam, at certain points in Turkish history, national security and 
human rights became intertwined, and self-defensive measures were used to guard 
national integrity. In order to protect public order and public security, the Turkish 
government has taken liberty to limit certain liberties of its citizens.
43
  
 Oğuzlu and Özpek argue that just as Europe supported independence movements 
in the Balkans during the last century of the Ottoman Empire, European Union accession 
might have the same results for the Republic of Turkey.
44
 Additionally, Fatma Müge 
Göçek writes that the Armenian, Kurdish, and Cypriot issues impede Turkey’s chances of 
joining the EU and democratizing. According to her, “the fear of loss of territory and the 
fear of abandonment not only became prominent themes in the Ottoman Empire but also 
persisted into the Turkish nation-state and still influence the premise of its official 
narrative.”45 Thus, even though Turkey has been carrying out legislative reforms, 
Europe’s intervention in its internal affairs has triggered Sèvres syndrome fears: the fear 
that Turkey’s territory will be carved up according to the territorial boundaries 
established by the Treaty of Sèvres.  
Ersel Aydinli claims that Turkey’s Sèvres syndrome is deeply rooted in the 
society and “any argument or movement which carries a separatist potential is readily 
seen as dangerous and subversive.”46 Therefore, PKK’s struggle to create an independent 
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Kurdish state is threatening national sovereignty of the country. For this reason, the 
Turkish government has prosecuted those who call for Kurdish autonomy. Some 
journalists have even been jailed for allegedly conspiring with the PKK to create an 
independent Kurdistan. Göçek makes it clear that in order for Turkey to democratize and 
not worry about surviving and sustaining itself at the expense of its citizens, Turkey 
needs to confront and find resolution to its past in entirety rather than looking at the 
Armenian, Kurdish, and Cyprus issues in fragments.
47
 She traces these issues back to the 
Treaty of San Stefano of 1878, which ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and 
posed a serious threat to Ottoman territorial integrity.  
 The Turkish Republic, in order to maintain its unity, wishes to be seen as a 
homogeneous nation in the eyes of Europe. The Turkish Constitution, according to 
Baskin Oran, denies the existence of minorities other than those identified in the Treaty 
of Lausanne, and it punishes those who defy this monolithic concept of the Turkish 
nation. The Anti-Terror Law of 1991 (Law No. 3173) described terrorism as an act to 
damage the “indivisible unity of the State,” which is understood as its territory and the 
nation itself. Loss of territory is one of the main fears of Kemalists.
48
 As Jahnisa Tate 
explains, the creators of the Republic of Turkey were afraid that the newfound state 
would face the fate of its predecessor, and to avoid division, adversarial politics faced 
serious barriers.
49
 Additionally, Mustafa Kemal wished to create a national identity not 
based on religion or race, which would prevail over outside challenges to its 
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unity. Consequently, those who publicly discuss the fragmented nature of Turkey face 
prosecution. 
 Ali Tekin has also addressed Turkey’s issue of sovereignty. He claims that 
Turkey perceives the Treaty of Lausanne to be the “guarantor of its security and survival 
and an entrenched idea that any change in the contents of this treaty would produce 
security risks.”50 The fear that Treaty of Sèvres may be revived has not diminished, and 
for this reason, the Kemalist elite, whose primary concern is the survival of the nation, 
created an indivisible, homogeneous, and a powerful sovereign nation. According to Nora 
Onar, Kemalists are ambivalent towards the West, but at the same time they have strived 
to westernize the Turkish Republic. The commitment to preserving national sovereignty 
at all costs has enhanced the role of the military.
51
 The armed forces in Turkey were able 
to maintain power through drafting the current Turkish Constitution in 1982. Paul 
Kubicek argues that the military constitution “gave the state sizeable discretion to restrict 
freedom of expression and association and gave the military an institutionalized role in 
many aspects of policymaking and in the judicial system.”52 Through the enactment of 
Article 159, and the current government’s Article 301, the military has ensured that 
minorities’ demands for equality and autonomy are suppressed. Turkey’s ill-treatment of 
the Kurdish minority, and the failure to reform and democratize its laws, prevented the 
country from being considered for EU membership for almost two decades. This did not 
become a reality until the 1999 Helsinki summit.  
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While liberals in Turkey wish to democratize the country and uphold human 
rights in order to obtain EU membership, Kemalists want to maintain the status quo by 
not allowing basic freedoms that are the universal norm in Europe. Tekin further 
questions whether Turkey will allow a potential EU membership to undermine its 
sovereignty. Because of the Sèvres syndrome, Kemalist elites have been hesitant to 
recognize social, cultural, and ethnic rights of minorities, and EU membership will clash 
with Turkey’s national sovereignty.53 Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu further argue that the reason 
why Turkey strives to become a member of the European community is out of security-
related reasons. Firstly, Turkey does not want a repetition of the Ottoman-era exclusion 
and dismemberment that it suffered. It does not wish to be perceived as a threat to the 
West, and that is why it wants to join the European community. As a result, the West will 
not interfere in the internal affairs of the country.
54
 Furthermore, in the past, the West 
used Christian minorities residing within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire to hold 
leverage over the Ottoman government.  
As Onar mentions in her discussion of the Armenian question, the need for the 
Republic of Turkey to censor its public, as well as the international community, derives 
from its fears of territorial reconfiguration. Onar discusses the usage of Article 301 to 
silence journalists and scholars who engage in the discussion of the Armenian claims. 
Thus, current literature that focuses on the implications for the enactment of Article 301 
and other legislation that limits freedom of speech traces this issue back to Ottoman 
history and the dissolution of the empire.  
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The Effects of Constrained Free Speech 
 
 The effects of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code have been immense, as 
hundreds of journalists and scholars have been incarcerated for simply writing and 
expressing their views on issues that need to be discussed in order to create a democratic 
society in Turkey. Those who fear prosecution choose self-censorship. Nazan 
Maksudyan, in her argument of Turkey’s ban on the discussion of the Armenian 
Genocide, writes that many translators, editors, and publishers, in order to escape 
prosecution, have chosen to censor their own writings. In their translations of books that 
address the Armenian massacres, editors and publishers use language that does not 
suggest that the 1915 events were a premeditated attack to exterminate the whole 
Armenian race. She also states that euphemistic terms are used as a method for 
censorship. Such words as “exterminate” become “resorting to violence” in the Turkish 
translations of genocide-era texts.
55
 This process hinders free discussion of human rights 
violations in Turkey and is a consequence of suppressed free speech through legislation.  
 Nonetheless, there are scholars who have spoken about the genocide and other 
issues that are silenced in Turkey despite facing prosecution and imprisonment. The 
World Socialist Web Site reported in 2006 that Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code 
was a highly controversial law that Amnesty International called a “direct threat to the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression.”56 It pointed out that this article was used to 
silence such prominent authors as Orhan Pamuk and Noam Chomsky’s publishers in 
Turkey, who discussed the Armenian and Kurdish issues. The Freedom House 2011 
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report on freedom of press in Turkey found that despite the amendments to the Turkish 
Penal Code in 2008, 104 journalists were imprisoned in the first half of 2011 for offenses 
related to freedom of speech.
57
 Moreover, according to the International Communication 
Network (BİA) 2011 Media Monitoring Report, 104 journalists and 30 distributors were 
behind bars, and Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law were 
jointly applied in these arrests.
58
 In 2010, the BİA Monitoring Report found that a total of 
249 people were facing prosecution under Article 301 for expressing their thoughts, 
while in 2009, this number was 125. Additionally, it found that the Anti-Terror Law was 
starting to be used more frequently to suppress human rights. The number of people that 
stood trial based on this law in 2010 was 110, a significant increase from the 20 indicted 
in 2009.
59
  
 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 2012 Report 
on Freedom of Media found that the number of journalists imprisoned in Turkey doubled 
from 2011. Most of these journalists were charged with Articles 5 and 7 of the Anti-
Terror Law, suspected of aiding terrorist organizations.
60
 In some cases, journalists were 
kept in jail awaiting trial, and if found guilty, they could face longer prison sentences 
than they would under Article 301.  Amnesty International’s 2011 annual report 
criticized Turkey’s legislation, claiming that it had stifled free expression.61 The Human 
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Rights Watch World Report also criticized the state of freedom of speech in the country. 
It stated that Turkish laws lagged behind, and individuals were prosecuted for non-violent 
writings and discourse.
62
 The report raised concern regarding government-sponsored 
internet censorship that restricted access to information and violated human rights. 
The European Commission 2011 Report on Turkey’s progress to becoming a EU 
member found that public debate of issues such as minority rights and the role of the 
military were becoming more popular subjects of public discussion. After the 2008 penal 
code amendments, only few cases were initiated on the basis of Article 301. However, 
freedom of media and speech remained restricted. European Commission’s report 
conveyed concern that writers and journalists writing about the Kurdish issue were 
convicted of terrorism propaganda. The report concluded: 
 
Overall, open debate, including on issues perceived as sensitive, continued. 
However, in practice, freedom of expression is undermined by the high number of 
legal cases and investigations against journalists, writers, academics and human 
rights defenders and undue pressure on the media, which raises serious concerns. 
The present legislation does not sufficiently guarantee freedom of expression in 
line with the ECHR and ECtHR case law and permits restrictive interpretation by 
the judiciary. Frequent website bans are another cause for serious concern. 
Turkey's legal and judicial practices, legislation, criminal procedures and political 
responses are obstacles to the free exchange of information and ideas.
 63
   
  
 The 2012 European Commission Report, despite the recent legislative reforms, 
did not find improvements in the current status of freedom of speech in Turkey. Merel 
van Beeren also noted that despite changes in the Turkish Penal Code, the state continued 
to prohibit the discussion of controversial issues and expected its citizens to maintain the 
status quo. According to van Beeren, although the press is protected under the Turkish 
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Constitution, the judicial system has censored minority media outlets “under the pretext 
of combating terrorism, preserving territorial unity and protecting the state.”64 Despite 
reforms that are meant to improve human rights, in practice Turkey continues to repress 
its population and fails to democratize. Lauren McLaren and Burak Cop point out that 
Article 301 poses a threat to democracy in Turkey and undermines freedom of speech. In 
2005, a total of 357 people faced criminal charges for publicly denigrating Turkishness. 
This number was the highest in 2006, with 386 cases filed against 526 people, but it went 
down to 77 cases in 2009 after the 2008 amendments, since prosecutors now needed an 
approval from the Minister of Justice.
65
 
 Overall, the Turkish government’s policy on limiting freedom of expression has 
had a negative impact on the country, hindering its EU accession and stirring up 
international criticism of its human rights record. In 2006, the European Parliament’s 
progress report on Turkey’s accession found that the reform process had slowed down 
and that progress was yet to be made in implementing freedom of expression laws, 
protecting minority rights, and resolving the conflict with Cyprus.
66
 By limiting speech, 
Turkey has taken away a right that is recognized in international human rights laws. 
However, the Republic of Turkey sees it necessary to suppress this right as a way to 
protect its national unity.  
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Theory of Free Speech on Legal and Moral Grounds 
 
 Although considered a fundamental right, in practice, freedom of speech has been 
subject to limitations on moral and legal grounds. Internationally, it is guaranteed under 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states:  
 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice.
67
 
 Additionally, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights also 
requires states to guarantee freedom of expression. It calls on states to allow the freedom 
“to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.”68 Simultaneously, all international laws 
pertaining to freedom of speech are subject to restrictions for the purpose of respecting 
the rights of others and protecting national security and public order. “Pressing social 
needs” limit public discourse, but they do not authorize governments to place restrictions 
on individual rights.
69
  
 John Stuart Mill, in his book On Liberty, defends basic human rights by 
suggesting that there is always a struggle between the authority and those who seek 
liberty. He believes that developing new ideas will ultimately uncover truths, and 
freedom of expression is essential in this process. Irene M. Ten Cate argues that Mill saw 
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the role of free speech as a means to develop culture and promote independent thinking, 
which in turn will contribute to the overall value of the society.
70
 Yet, free speech can 
pose a serious threat to personal and national security if it reveals secrets, puts other’s life 
in danger, and so on.
 71
 The real question for van Mill is where limitations on speech are, 
not whether or not restrictions are needed. 
 Although an advocate of freedom of expression, John Stuart Mill placed 
limitations on this right based on his “harm principle,” which is explained through the 
following:  
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
72
  
   
Thus, it can be understood that both the government and the public can interfere 
to prevent harm from taking place. However, Mill also believes that free discussion can 
benefit the overall society. To attain truth, logical arguments should be allowed, no 
matter how immoral those discussions may be. In analyzing Mill, Philip Kitcher argues 
that “gaining knowledge is important for the realization of this freedom, and freedom of 
discussion is important for the role it plays in enabling people to gain relevant forms of 
knowledge.”73 New ideas reveal truths, which are essential in the principle of 
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utilitarianism.
74
 For Mill, utilitarianism is the greatest good for the greatest amount of 
people. Therefore, if freedom of expression can increase knowledge and the value of the 
overall society, then it should be unlimited.  
Joel Feinberg, on the other hand, introduces the “offence principle” contrary to 
Mill’s “harm principle.” He believes that some forms of discourse need to be prohibited 
because of their offensive nature. J. Angelo Corlett highlights Feinberg’s five areas of 
unprotected expression, which are insulting and spreading hateful speech, invasion of 
privacy, causing fear, provoking retaliatory violence, and provoking crime or a revolt.
75
  
Although Feinberg deems freedom of speech important for the development of humans, 
whenever it poses direct and substantial harm, this liberty should be limited.  
John Stuart Mill and Joel Feinberg understand the importance of free dialogue, 
but they both believe that this right may be constrained when it can cause damage to the 
society. However, William Magnuson argues that the international community has an 
obligation to protect free speech and intervene in the affairs of foreign governments when 
this right is violated. He does not suggest military invasion every time freedom of 
expression is affected, but the adoption of a broader international law on this issue will 
make it the responsibility of each state to protect fundamental human rights. Magnuson 
states: “Moral arguments that place the value of individual rights above the value of 
territorial sovereignty naturally apply to the freedom of expression.”76 Protecting free 
speech is more important than upholding the notion of a sacred state sovereignty, a 
concept that has lost its value as globalization has taken a center stage in the latter half of 
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the last century. Thus, freedom of expression becomes the responsibility of the global 
community, both morally and legally.   
36 
 
Part IV: Case Studies 
Orhan Pamuk 
 
Internationally known Turkish novelist and recipient of the 2006 Nobel Prize in 
Literature, Orhan Pamuk was one of the first scholars to be charged under Article 301 of 
the Turkish Penal Code. His crime was “insulting Turkishness” through statements made 
in an interview with Swiss magazine Das Bild in February 2005. Pamuk simply stated 
that thirty-thousand Kurds and one million Armenians were killed in Turkey and that 
nobody dared to talk about it.
77
 This statement unleashed a firestorm of death threats, 
demonstrations, and acts of violence from ultra-nationalists, and he was forced to flee 
from Turkey.  
Orhan Pamuk confessed that he felt “somewhat embarrassed” that his trial was 
“overdramatized.”78 At the time, similar cases were pending against sixty other writers 
and journalists. However, it was only his trial that gained so much international attention 
and strong criticism from Europe. Despite the fact that Turkish-Armenian journalist 
Hrant Dink had previously been found guilty for the same charges Pamuk was facing, he 
was optimistic that he would not be imprisoned.  
The trial commenced in December 2005, but since Pamuk was charged under ex 
post facto law (his statement was made while Article 159 was still in effect), Şişli Court 
of First Instance No. 2 needed an approval from the Ministry of Justice to proceed with 
the trial. In January 2006, the case was dropped because the Ministry of Justice withheld 
permission to carry out the trial. The Ministry claimed that after the May 2005 legislative 
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reforms the case was out of its jurisdiction. This might have been regarded as a victory 
for human rights in Turkey, but it was only a small step towards granting freedom of 
speech in the country. The dropping of the case did not occur on the grounds of freedom 
of expression, but rather for a lack of approval to proceed with the case. Many in Turkey 
saw Pamuk’s trial as part of a wider struggle between those who opposed joining Europe 
and those who supported legislative change and EU membership.
79
 The case was a test of 
Turkey’s commitment to democracy, which some thought was achieved through this 
victory.  
Perhaps the reason the Ministry of Justice refused to intervene in the Pamuk case 
was because of the international outrage it sparked and the close monitoring by the 
European Union and international governmental organizations. Additionally, the decision 
to drop the case came right before the EU was to begin a review of Turkey’s judicial 
system.
80
 Possibly, in order to avoid further disapproval, Pamuk was acquitted. Europe 
welcomed the dropping of the case, but it still pressured the Turkish government to repeal 
Article 301 and halt the ongoing trials against other human rights activists for “insulting 
Turkishness.” Although Pamuk was set free, Turkey’s image as a country that had taken 
the path of democracy was damaged. Europe became even more skeptical of Turkey and 
questioned whether it would ever become a suitable EU candidate and make the 
necessary judicial reforms to gain acceptance into the union.  
Orhan Pamuk became an advocate of human rights in Turkey. He stood by his 
words even as he was facing up to three years in prison. In an interview with BBC News 
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he stated, "What happened to the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 was a major thing that was 
hidden from the Turkish nation; it was a taboo. But we have to be able to talk about the 
past."
81
 His statement was meant to stand for freedom of expression rights in Turkey and 
allow others to speak about the history of the early twentieth century. He believed that in 
order to prove that the reforms in Turkey worked and that the country was moving in the 
right direction, someone needed to speak about subjects and events that were censored by 
the authorities.   
Additionally, Pamuk denounced the Turkish government for its mistreatment of 
writers at the 2008 Frankfurt Book Fair. He blamed the AKP regime for using Article 301 
to silence scholars and claimed that in the process it made Turkish literature poorer. He 
also stated that many international and domestic web sites were blocked in Turkey for 
“political reasons.”82 This censorship of the Internet has been an obstacle for those who 
want to learn the truth about Turkey’s past. With scholars silenced and no alternative 
sources to conduct research on the prohibited subjects, many in Turkey remain unaware 
of this human rights struggle.  
After his 2005 statement, six individuals took legal action against Pamuk for 
“having accused all Turkish people.”83 The Şişli Court declined to hear the case because 
it argued that the violation was against the Turkish nation as a whole rather than 
individuals. The case was appealed, and in 2009 the Supreme Court of Appeal’s General 
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Committee found that the 2005 statement violated people’s honor and self-respect. 
Pamuk was ordered to pay 6,000 liras in compensation for insulting Turkishness.
84
  
Even though his comments in the Swiss magazine about the Armenian and 
Kurdish massacres led to his prosecution by the Turkish authorities and endangered his 
life, Orhan Pamuk opened an important dialogue in the country. In an interview with The 
Telegraph in 2012, he stated with pride that now everyone discusses the Armenian 
issue.
85
 His prosecution not only educated the public about these subjects and human 
rights violations in Turkey, but it granted others the courage to freely express their 
thoughts and opinions. 
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Hrant Dink 
 
 Hrant Dink, editor of Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, was passionate about 
human rights and wanted to inform the Turkish public about the Armenian Genocide and 
Armenian identity. He wanted Armenians and Turks to come to terms with the past and 
live peacefully side-by-side. He used Agos to encourage Turkey’s Armenian population 
to come out of hiding and admit their Armenian identity, meanwhile reaffirming their 
Turkish citizenship.
86
 He believed that if the Turkish public learned about what happened 
in 1915, they would be compassionate and make their own government recognize the 
genocide. By writing and speaking about the Armenian issue in Turkey, Dink was 
indicted under Article 159 and later Article 301 three times. He was also responsible for 
helping to organize a conference about the Armenian Genocide in Turkey in 2005, and 
this further made him a target for prosecution.  
The first charge against Dink came in 2002 for insulting the concept of 
Turkishness under Article 159 after he stated at a human rights panel: 
Since my childhood, I have been singing the national anthem along with you. 
Recently, there is a section where I cannot sing any longer and remain silent. You 
sing it, I join you later. It is: Smile at my heroic race... Where is the heroism of 
this race? We are trying to form the concept of citizenship on national unity and a 
heroic race. For example, if it were Smile at my hard-working people..., I would 
sing it louder than all of you, but it is not. Of the oath I am Turkish, honest and 
hard-working, I like the 'honest and hard-working' part and I shout it loudly. The I 
am Turkish part, I try to understand as I am from Turkey.
87
  
 
Dink was prosecuted for refusing to simply identify himself as a Turk; instead he 
described himself as an Armenian of Turkey. Moreover, a series of articles published in 
Agos in 2004, entitled “The Armenian identity,” led to charges filed against Dink for 
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“degrading Turkishness.” He was sentenced to six months in prison; this sentence was 
suspended since Dink did not have a previous criminal record, although other charges 
were pending against him.
88
 Dink’s case was not known worldwide, but the high profile 
case of Orhan Pamuk made the international community aware of this human rights 
abuse in Turkey; Hrant Dink’s case gained the international community’s attention as 
well. Just like Pamuk, Dink was branded a traitor and an enemy of Turkey.
89
 A day after 
an investigation was opened against Dink in February 2005, nationalist group Ülkü 
Ocaklary gathered in front of Agos and shouted slogans, such as, “Be careful", "you will 
be held accountable," and "your hand will be broken.”90 These death threats continued for 
years, until Dink’s 2007 murder. Reportedly, there were a total of 26,000 death threats, 
but Dink was not intimidated by these threats and continued to fight for the rights of 
Turkish-Armenians until the end.
91
 
In 2006, Dink was charged under Article 301 along with his son Arat Dink and 
Editor-in-chief Serkis Seropyan for another article published in Agos, entitled “I vote 
against 301.” The trial was supposed to commence on March 22, 2007, but it never took 
place because Dink was murdered on January 19 of that year. On that Friday morning, as 
Dink stepped out of his office to run errands, he was shot three times by 17-year-old 
Ogün Samast. Dink’s death was mourned by 100,000 Turks, who went into the streets, 
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carrying signs that read, “We are all Hrant Dink, we are all Armenians,” and “Murderous 
301.”92  
Hrant Dink’s assassin received a hero’s welcome at the gendarmerie following his 
arrest, which was secretly filmed on a mobile phone. Others were arrested soon after in 
connection with the murder. Yasin Hayal, a militant nationalist, was charged with 
masterminding the murder and received a life in prison sentence; however, he and several 
others were acquitted of state-sponsored terrorism charges.
93
 Samast, on the other hand, 
was sentenced to twenty-three years in prison. Human Rights Watch reported that the 
Istanbul and Trabzon police failed to prevent Dink’s murder, and during the 
investigation, the prosecutors failed to take legal action against state authorities who 
withheld evidence.
94
  Moreover, those behind Dink’s murder were promoted to higher- 
ranking positions. For example, Yakup Kurtaran, a police officer who posed with 
Samasat behind a Turkish flag after the assassination, was promoted to a public security 
deputy manager position in the province of Malatya.
95
 Additionally, Ali Fuat Yilmazer 
and Ahmet İlhan Güler, who were accused of negligence during the preliminary 
preparations for Dink’s assassination investigations, were promoted to the post of a first 
class police director.
96
 Dink’s lawyers appealed the court decision that acquitted 19 
suspects for plotting his murder. In its final ruling, an Istanbul court ruled that there was 
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no evidence indicating the existence of a terrorist organization behind the assassination.
97
 
Due to a lack of evidence the court found that those responsible for the crime were acting 
independently.  
Dink’s murder contributed to the legislative amendments in 2008, but as 
discussed previously, the reforms did not improve human rights in Turkey. In 2010, in 
the case of Dink v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled against 
Turkey, stating that the Turkish authorities failed to protect Dink’s life, failed to 
investigate his murder, and failed to uphold his right to freedom of expression.
98
 It is 
believed that Dink’s murder was politically and ethnically motivated. The media played a 
part in his murder because it portrayed him as a traitor and gave a voice to ultra-
nationalists during the coverage of Article 301 prosecutions. The media presented Dink 
and Pamuk as scholars who sold their country to Europe for their personal gain.
99
 Dink 
and others who wrote about the Armenian Genocide were also accused of encouraging 
France to pass a law criminalizing genocide denial. The international community 
condemned the Turkish government for allowing such a hate crime to occur and for 
limiting freedom of expression. As Turkey was preparing for legislative reforms in 2008, 
it seemed as if positive change was near, but in actuality, freedom of speech remained 
constrained and new cases were brought against intellectuals for insulting Turkishness.   
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Altuğ Taner Akçam 
 
Altuğ Taner Akçam is one the first Turkish scholars to discuss and write about the 
Armenian Genocide. In January 2007, he was subject of a criminal probe by the Şişli 
Office of the Public Prosecutor for criticizing the prosecution of Hrant Dink in an 
editorial, but charges were later dropped. The sentence, “I believe that what happened 
between 1915 and 1917 was a holocaust,” from his article in Agos, opened an 
investigation against Akçam.
100
 The prosecutor concluded that his statement was 
protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and thus, it did 
not insult Turkishness. Although the Turkish government assured that Akçam would not 
face further prosecution after the 2008 legislative changes and that he would be allowed 
to conduct research in the State Archives, Akçam himself claimed the contrary. He 
alleged that the public thought of him as a traitor; he faced public persecution and 
became a target of death threats from Turkish ultranationalists for writing about the 
genocide.
101
  
Despite two other complaints filed against Taner Akçam by extremists in October 
2007, the Şişili Public Investigator issued a decision of non-prosecution.102 Nonetheless, 
Akçam, in fear for his life, stopped writing about the Armenian Genocide. Relying on 
Article 10 of the European Convention, he submitted a case in the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) to prove that his right to freedom of expression was violated by 
the government.  
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As evidence that Article 301 was a threat to human rights, Akçam provided 
statistics from the Media Monitoring Desk of the Independent Communications Network, 
which showed that from July to September 2008, 116 people were prosecuted for their 
writings, 77 of whom were journalists. Akçam claimed that his life was in danger. The 
criminal proceedings against him had turned into a harassment campaign and the media 
portrayed him as a “German spy.” 103 He alleged that the government could not guarantee 
his safety and give assurance that he would not face another trial for his work and his 
views in the future.  
A verdict was reached in the Taner Akçam v. Turkey case in October 2011. The 
ECHR unanimously ruled that the recognition of the Armenian Genocide could not be 
criminalized in Turkey because it was in violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
104
 Additionally, the court found: 
 
There had been an “interference” with Mr Taner Akçam’s right to freedom of 
expression. The criminal investigation launched against him and the Turkish 
criminal courts’ standpoint on the Armenian issue in their application of Article 
301 of the Criminal Code (any criticism of the official line on the issue in effect 
being sanctioned), as well as the public campaign against him, confirmed that 
there was a considerable risk of prosecution faced by persons who expressed 
“unfavourable” opinions on the subject and indicated that the threat hanging over 
Mr. Taner Akçam was real. The measures adopted to provide safeguards against 
arbitrary or unjustified prosecutions under Article 301 had not been sufficient.
105
 
 
The Turkish government’s argument against the Akçam v. Turkey case was that 
the 2008 penal code amendments requiring the permission of the Ministry of Justice to 
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carry out a prosecution prevented the misapplication of Article 301.
106
 The ECHR 
dismissed this claim, reasoning that if in the future the government decides to change its 
policy, the provision may be applied in similar cases. Even though the court ruled in 
favor of Akçam, this did not affect freedom of speech laws in Turkey, as more journalists 
were incarcerated for expressing their opinion on topics deemed “unfavorable” by the 
government.  
In an interview with Le Monde newspaper in January 2012, Akçam addressed 
Turkish leadership’s denial of the Armenian Genocide. Discussing his work, he said: 
 
My international colleagues speak of my “courage” to pursue this subject in the 
face of “threats and dangers” from Turkey. However, that has never really been 
my problem. My biggest challenge was loneliness. I have had a hard time trying 
to explain the significance of 1915 events to my closest friends in Turkey.
107
 
 
 Although he knew about the consequences writing about the genocide posed, 
Akçam wanted to educate the public. He was able to make his colleagues interested in the 
subject and inspired other scholars to challenge the status quo and address issues that 
were considered taboo. The ECHR ruling proved that Turkey had no right to limit 
people’s freedoms and gave voice to those who had been silenced by the government.  
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Ragip Zarakolu 
 
 Ragip Zarakolu has become a symbol for freedom of expression and freedom of 
press in Turkey and is an internationally-recognized defender of human rights. He is the 
founder of Belge Publishing House, which has published numerous books on 
controversial issues in Turkey, such as the Armenian and Kurdish questions. This has led 
to Zarakolu’s prosecution under Article 301 numerous times. In 2005, he was indicted for 
publishing Dora Sakayan’s book An Armenian Doctor in Turkey: Garabed Hatcherian: 
My Smyrna Ordeal of 1922, which was perceived to have insulted the army and 
Turkishenss. He was acquitted in this case, but was found guilty in another case; 
Zarakolu was accused of offending the Turkish state for publishing George Jerjian’s book 
The Truth Will Liberate Us, which is about the mass deportations of Armenians. In June 
2008, he was sentenced to five months in prison for translating and publishing Jerjian’s 
book, but the judge ordered him to pay a fine instead of facing imprisonment due to good 
behavior.
108
 This, however, was not the last time he was indicted for exercising his right 
to free speech and standing up for human rights.  
In 2009, Mehmet Güler and Ragip Zarakolu stood trial for the publication of 
Güler’s book More Difficult Decisions than Death, which according to the prosecutor 
evoked sympathy for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In June 2010, Zarakolu was 
acquitted, but Mehmet Güler was sentenced to fifteen months in prison.
 109
 In March 
2011, following the publication of Mehmet Güler’s book The KCK File/The Global State 
and Kurds without a State, both scholars faced prosecution for their work once again. The 
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book was immediately banned after its publication. Zarakolu was convicted under Article 
7/2 of the Anti-Terror Law of spreading propaganda in support of the PKK. In this case, 
the Istanbul 10
th
 High Criminal Court sentenced Güler to a fifteen-month suspended 
prison sentence and ordered a monetary fine for Zarakolu.
110
 All these trials led to a 
bigger case against PKK sympathizers.  
In October 2011, Zarakolu and 41 other individuals, including Professor Büşra 
Ersanli, were arrested as part of a government crackdown on people involved with pro-
Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party and the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK).
 
The 
KCK is believed to be an executive organ of the PKK.
111
 Emma Sinclair-Webb, a Turkey 
researcher at Human Rights Watch said, “The arrests of Ragip Zarakolu and Büşra 
Ersanli represent a new low in the misuse of terrorism laws to crush freedom of 
expression and association in Turkey.”112 The arrests sparked international outrage yet 
again against Turkey’s violation of human rights, and the European community 
demanded Zarakolu’s immediate release.   
The arrests took place under the Anti-Terror Law, which accused the detained 
individuals in aiding a terrorist organization. During a raid of Zarakolu’s house, police 
found no evidence linking him to such an organization, but they confiscated books on the 
Armenian Genocide as part of “evidence of crime.”113 In February, Zarakolu was 
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nominated for the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize, and about a month after this announcement he 
was released from prison pending trial.  
After his release, Ragip Zarakolu was quoted saying, “I feel like I was used. I 
think my arrest was a conspiracy. The state just wanted to give the impression that it had 
accepted its mistakes. This hurts me.”114 The international community’s attention to this 
case and other human rights abuses in Turkey decreased immediately after Zarakolu’s 
release from prison. Perhaps the Turkish authorities decided to free Zarakolu because his 
case was starting to resemble that of Orhan Pamuk’s. Even though other scholars, 
including Ragip’s son, remained imprisoned, public interest in the Kurdish terrorism 
trials diminished.  
The first hearing of the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) trial began in July 
2012 at the 15
th
 High Criminal Court in the Silivri district of Istanbul. More than two 
hundred individuals, including Zarakolu and Professor Ersanli, stood trial in a 2401 page 
long indictment.  During the first hearing, the defense lawyers demanded the court to 
allow the prisoners to plea in their native language. The Chief Justice rejected this, and 
the lawyers responded by walking out of the courtroom in objection.
115
 At the next court 
hearing in October 2012, the judge ordered gendarmerie troops to escort a defense lawyer 
out of the courthouse by force for “violating the integrity of the hearing.” The lawyer had 
asked the judge to grant the defendants the right to speak about the hunger strikes of 
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jailed Kurdish militants that were underway.
116
 Additionally, the question of using 
Kurdish in court was raised again, but the judge rejected the request based on the fact that 
all of the defendants spoke Turkish.
117
 The hearing ended with defendant lawyers 
presenting their pleas in writing. The KCK trial will resume in January 2013.   
Zarakolu is one of the numerous casualties of Article 301 and the Anti-Terror 
Law. According to 2011-2012 World Press Freedom Report of Reporters without Borders 
(RSF) Organization, Turkey placed 148
th
 among 179 countries, making it one of the 
lowest ranked European countries.
118
 The Turkish government continues to deny its 
citizens the right to express themselves freely despite its portrayal as a regional model. 
Since 2010, Turkey has especially used the Anti-Terror Law to imprison journalists and 
human rights activists. Zarakolu’s trial is still pending, and if found guilty, he could face 
up to fifteen years in prison.  
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Part V: Reflections, Discussion, Analysis  
Politics of Free Speech in Turkey 
 
 The Republic of Turkey was established based on the Kemalist ideology of 
nationalism, secularism, populism, republicanism, statism, and revolutionism; state 
interest was protected under all circumstances, and a unified national image was created 
to ensure the survival of the republic.
119
 The Ottoman Empire lacked unity, which 
eventually led to its demise in the early twentieth century. Strong nationalist sentiments 
not only led to uprisings in the Balkans but also to the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. 
Those who came to power after the revolution had close connections with the military, 
and secret societies were set up to ensure the Turkish state’s independence and 
continuity. Those secret societies are believed to have survived to this day and be the real 
drive behind the Turkish state’s social, economic, and political structures.120 The military 
institution, which has enjoyed an immense amount of power for decades, has intervened 
in Turkish politics numerous times to correct the mistakes of a civilian government and to 
align the republic with the Kemalist constitutional order. In order to protect state interests 
and ensure the continuity of Mustafa Kemal’s ideas, the military has seized power in 
1960, 1971, 1980, and most recently presented a military memorandum in 1997. Each 
time, the military regime has restricted freedoms to Turkish citizens by enacting new 
laws and drafting a new constitution.
121
 Although the current AKP government reforms 
have curtailed the role of the military, the deep state, which allegedly is a secret military 
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network that acts parallel to the Turkish civilian government, is still present and 
powerful.  
 Although further evidence is required to prove the presence of the deep state in 
state affairs, its existence has been acknowledged by many prominent members of 
Turkey’s political system. The meaning of the term ‘deep state’ is somewhat elusive, but 
Former Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stated in 2005 that the deep state was the 
military and the state itself.
122
 It is not only found in the military institution but has 
spilled into multiple facets of the state machinery, creating a state within the state. The 
Ottoman military corps became the basis for the modern Turkish Armed Forces when the 
Republic of Turkey was established.
123
 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who was a military 
officer himself, used the military to strengthen the newfound republic. The officer corps 
assumed an important role, but at the same time, Mustafa Kemal created barriers to 
military’s direct involvement in the country’s everyday political life.  
 In 1950, the Democratic Party (DP) came to power and introduced new social and 
economic policies that weakened the political power and the social status of the armed 
forces. Consequently, a coup was staged in 1960 by the military. It established a new 
regime, drafting a new Constitution, creating a Senate, and founding the National 
Security Council (NSC), which would craft the national security policy and serve as an 
advisory body to the Council of Ministers. Through the NSC, the military had a legal 
right to intervene in the country’s political and economic affairs. Another coup followed 
in 1971, which was an attempt by the military to prevent radical officers from 
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gaining power.
124
 This coup strengthened the political authority of the military even 
more; however, it gave back the power to a civilian government and created a system that 
would allow the development of small parties.  
By 1980, Turkey was facing socio-economic problems. The military was able to 
step in once again and create a new regime, becoming the only legal and political ruler of 
Turkey from 1980 to 1983. This time around, it introduced a new constitution that would 
ensure that its work would not be destroyed once control of the state was transferred to a 
civilian government. The Senate was abolished, the Grant National Assembly’s 
membership reduced, and the president’s power was increased under the new 
constitution. The NSC’s power was enhanced, and based on Constitutional Article 118, 
the Council of Ministers would have to take into consideration the opinion of the NSC in 
making decisions regarding “the preservation of the existence and independence of the 
state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of the 
society.”125  
 The deep state has continuously fought against “enemies” of the nation that have 
threatened the stability of the country, and in the process, it has weakened political 
institutions.
126
 Every time there has been an attempt to change Turkey, democratize the 
country, and allow diversity and transparency, the military has intervened. The most 
recent resistance against change took place in February 1997. The Turkish military’s 
power rose sharply, and the Turkish Armed Forces, using constitutional structures, 
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became engaged in politics at the micro and macro levels.
127
 This further affected those 
who spoke against the government.   
Kemalists, who want to preserve the existing state of affairs and maintain a 
unified national identity, see those who refuse to conform to their norms as 
secessionists.
128
 In particular, those who speak about the role of the military are silenced, 
and scholars and human rights activists that speak about the Armenian and Kurdish issues 
become the enemy of the deep state. Hrant Dink was one of those casualties. His murder 
was associated with Turkish nationalism, but in reality those responsible for his 
assassination were traced back to the military, and thus, the deep state. Numerous others 
have been kidnapped and assassinated because of their views and the expression of their 
thoughts. In the last thirty years, approximately 17,500 have fallen victim to their ideas 
and ideologies that did not line up with those of the deep state.
129
  
 The current AKP government, ever since coming into power in 2002, has been 
actively carrying out constitutional and legislative reforms, which although have not 
improved human rights in Turkey, nonetheless have attempted to grant fundamental 
rights and liberties to Turkish citizens and have curtailed privileges enjoyed by the 
military. In 2007, the AKP government opened prosecutions of military personnel and 
enacted constitutional amendments to end the dual judiciary system; thus, civilians 
cannot be tried before military courts, as was the case before the amendment. However, 
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the armed forces still have their hand in civilian courts, as neither the Military High 
Administrative Court nor the Military Supreme Court has been abolished.
130
  
In spite of all the attempts to limit the role of the armed forces, “the military’s 
political influence in Turkey is due less to legal regulations than to historical, 
sociological, and political factors.”131 The armed forces in Turkey have been part of the 
political process since Ottoman times, and with the extermination of Armenians and the 
exodus of Greeks from Turkey in the early twentieth century, the military was the only 
remaining body that could modernize Turkey and ensure its survival. Additionally, 
whenever its power has been in jeopardy, the military has staged coups to protect its 
place in Turkish politics. Thus, even if the current government carries out reforms to limit 
the power of the armed forces, the deep state’s network is interwoven in the very identity 
of the republic; hence, it is inseparable.  
Despite trying to modernize Turkey and bring its legislation in line with that of 
the European Union, it appears that the Turkish government is pushing forward the 
agenda of the deep state by not allowing certain freedoms to its citizens. One of the 
reasons that the authorities have refused to grant freedom of speech has to do with 
national elections; the AKP government wants to hold on to power, and if Article 301 is 
abolished, people will start asking questions and challenge the current regime.
132
 
However, as discussed previously, the main reason for the suppression of this right has to 
do with Turkey not willing to open public debate about the Armenian and Kurdish issues 
and to keep its territory and homogeneous image in the eyes of the European Union.  
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The Turkish government continued its reforms for EU accession in 2012 after 
strong criticism from the European Union and Council of Europe. The European 
Commission expressed concern in its October 2011 progress report regarding the status 
of human rights in Turkey. A new legal reform package was introduced in February 
2012, which according to the Human Rights Watch “left key problems with free 
speech.”133 The reforms did not affect terrorism laws and the Turkish government’s 
arbitrary restriction on free speech. Journalists and editors arrested for their alleged 
connection to armed groups would still have to face the maximum prison sentence of five 
years.  
 A third judicial reform package was adopted in July 2012 that lifted press 
restrictions on reporting criminal investigations, but some issues relating to Armenians 
and the military remained sensitive and censored. The European Commission’s 2012 
Turkey Progress Report commended Turkey for progress made regarding legislation 
aimed at increasing gender equality and women’s rights; however, the Commission 
criticized Turkey’s human rights record. The increased imprisonment of journalists, 
editors, and media workers raised serious concerns. The Report states: 
Overall, the increase in violations of freedom of expression raises serious 
concerns, and freedom of the media was further restricted in practice. The legal 
framework, especially as regards organized crime and terrorism, and its 
interpretation by the courts, leads to abuses. Together with pressure on the press 
by state officials and the firing of critical journalists, this situation has led to 
widespread self-censorship. Frequent website bans are a cause for serious concern 
and there is a need to revise the law on the internet.
134
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Although the Report mentions that few cases have been brought forth on the basis 
of Article 301 in the last year, other laws have been used to suppress free speech. Those 
who participate in demonstrations demanding Kurdish rights are often convicted under 
Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law (making propaganda for a terrorist organization).
135
 This 
law, combined with Articles 220 and 314 of the Turkish Penal Code, can lead to a 
criminal case for membership in a terrorist organization.
136
 This clearly indicates that 
despite reforms, the Turkish government is unwilling to lift the ban on freedom of 
expression.  
 President Abdullah Gül, just days before the release of the European 
Commission’s annual progress report, called on the Turkish Parliament to prioritize EU 
harmonization law reforms. Additionally, Prime Minister Erdoğan's Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) is drafting a new constitution to replace the one drafted by the 
military regime in 1982.
137
 Even if the AKP government shows willingness to continue 
bringing Turkish laws in line with the EU acquis, it is unlikely that future reforms and the 
new constitution will lift the ban on free speech. Erdoğan’s government has moved away 
from Mustafa Kemal’s pro-Western ideas and has entered an anti-Western era. It has 
sidelined the anti-Islamist forces and neutralized the power of the military. It appears that 
Turkey is no longer a country that wishes to democratize and Westernized. Rather, it 
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wants to strengthen ties with the Middle East and regain the “power and prestige” of the 
Ottoman Empire.
 138
  
Although Erdoğan has stated that the era of coups has ended, there is still a 
possibility that the military, which does not wish to see change in Turkey and adheres to 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's vision of the country, could revert to power and overthrow the 
AKP government.
139
 Overall, in order to have substantial change in Turkey, the public 
has to be educated about the deep state and demand the current government to have a 
truly democratic constitution and look to the West for inspiration. Turkey has the 
potential to become a superpower, but it cannot halt reforms aimed at improving human 
rights.  
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Politics of Free Speech in the Global Context 
  
 Freedom of speech is not an absolute right; however, everyone is entitled to it. All 
democratic regimes include a freedom of expression clause in their constitutions, but in 
practice, this right is suppressed time and time again. For example, freedom of speech in 
the United States is protected by the First Amendment in the US Constitution, but there 
are certain limitations to this right; speech is restricted when it can inflame crime, incite 
hate, and reveal military secrets that can jeopardize the national security of the country. 
However, in the US, unlike in Turkey, one will not be put in jail for writing about history 
and what happened to the Native Americans. Additionally, in the US, people can freely 
write about the Armenian Genocide without the fear that they will be prosecuted. On the 
other hand, Turkey has attempted numerous times to censor the US and the rest of the 
world when it came to the recognition of the Armenian Genocide.  
 Turkey has silenced the US government and has hindered the passage of a 
resolution formally recognizing the Armenian Genocide by the government. For several 
decades, the US Congress has unsuccessfully tried to adopt an official genocide 
recognition resolution, which has been blocked by the Turkish government. In 1999, the 
House of Representatives adopted H.Res.398 to the 106
th
 Congress.
140
 The bill was 
referred to the House Committee on International Relations and passed by a voice vote, 
but it was never put on the agenda for a full House vote. A similar attempt was made in 
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2005 with H. Res.316 to the 109
th
 Congress.
141
 Senator Durbin (D-Ill) introduced a 
similar resolution in the Senate. S.Res.320 had 34 co-sponsors, but no vote took place on 
the bill.
142
 In 2007, yet another attempt was made by Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) in the 
House with H.Res106, which had 212 cosponsors, to officially recognize the Armenian 
Genocide. The US House Resolution 106 stated the following:  
 
The House of Representatives-- 
(1) calls upon the President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States 
reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to 
human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States 
record relating to the Armenian Genocide and the consequences of the failure to 
realize a just resolution; and 
(2) calls upon the President in the President's annual message commemorating the 
Armenian Genocide issued on or about April 24, to accurately characterize the 
systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1,500,000 Armenians as genocide and to 
recall the proud history of United States intervention in opposition to the 
Armenian Genocide.
143
 
 
This resolution was nonbinding and did not condemn Turkey’s actions. It merely 
acknowledged the fact that 1.5 million Armenians perished during WWI and that the US 
was a champion in aiding the survivors of the genocide. Despite Turkish lobbyists’ 
attempts to block the bill, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed it by a 27-21 
vote and sent it for a full House vote. This resolution saw fierce opposition from the 
Republic of Turkey. Turkish President Abdullah Gül stated, “This unacceptable decision 
of the committee, like similar ones in the past, is not regarded by the Turkish 
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people as valid or of any value."
144
 Former President George W. Bush and former 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged Congress to stop the resolution from reaching 
a full House vote. President Bush stated that he would veto the bill if it reached his desk. 
The reasoning against the adoption of this proposed law was that it would damage 
relations with Turkey, and that the matter of genocide recognition would have to be left 
for historians to determine. Consequently, H.Res106 was never voted on by the House of 
Representatives.  
The most recent attempt by the US Congress to pass a similar resolution took 
place in 2010. H.Res252 narrowly passed a House Committee on Foreign Affairs vote 
and was to be placed on the House calendar for a full vote.
145
 However, as in the previous 
cases, this never took place. Turkey immediately recalled its Ambassador to the United 
States after the 23-22 vote in favor of the motion and threatened to cut all diplomatic ties 
with the US.
146
 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu urged Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton to hinder a full House vote on H.Res252, and the Obama administration’s 
stance on the issue resembled that of President Bush. All measures were taken to avoid 
putting the resolution on Congress’ agenda.  
Turkey was successful yet again in blackmailing the US government. It is true 
that Turkey is a strong NATO partner, with the second largest military in the alliance. 
The Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey has been crucial in the Iraq War, and Turkish 
troops have contributed to the coalition forces in Afghanistan. However, the US cannot 
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allow Turkey to influence and intrude in its domestic and international affairs. If Turkey 
threatens to refuse American access to Incirlik Air Base, the US has other options in the 
area, such as its air base in Germany that allows for a quick access to the Middle East.
147
 
Cutting down diplomatic relations with the US will have a negative effect on Turkey, 
which will lose its main supplier of military equipment.  
The US government has been supporting Turkey’s campaign of genocide denial 
for years. In 2006, US Ambassador to Armenia John Evans was relieved of his post for 
unidentified reasons, but his termination came after statements he made confirming the 
Armenian Genocide. Additionally, as a Senator, President Barack Obama supported the 
passage of the Armenian Genocide bill and pledged to recognize it as president.
148
 
However, during his first visit to Turkey as president, he failed to use the word 
“genocide.” Moreover, during his Armenian Remembrance Day address on April 24, 
2009, President Obama once again let down his Armenian-American constituents and 
avoided the usage of the word “genocide.” Year after year, President Obama has been 
calling the events of 1915 as “one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century,” but he 
refuses to fulfill his campaign promise.
149
 Thus, the US government has been censoring 
itself and has become another victim of Turkey’s Article 301.  
Europe, on the other hand, has put an external pressure on Turkey to recognize the 
Armenian Genocide. Most notably, France has been a champion of Armenian rights and 
                                                 
147
 Michael Birnbaum, “German Town Fear Loss of U.S. Army Base,” The Washington Post, March 27, 
2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/german-town-fears-loss-of-us-army-
base/2012/03/23/gIQAoNzzeS_story.html.  
148
 “Barak Obama Calls for Passage of Armenian Genocide Resolution,” Armenian National Committee of 
America, January 20, 2008. http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_releases.php?prid=1365.  
149
 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Armenian Remembrance 
Day,” White House Press Release (April 24, 2012).  
63 
 
has criticized Turkey for its denial of the massacre. In 1998, the French National 
Assembly formally recognized the events of 1915 as genocide, which became law in 
2001.
150
 This was complemented by a French National Assembly bill in 2006, which 
would punish anyone who denied the mass extermination of Armenians with up to five 
years in prison and a €45,000 fine. However, the measure never reached the Senate. In 
December 2011, the French National Assembly once again adopted a similar bill 
outlawing genocide denial, which included both the Armenian Genocide and the 
Holocaust. The Turkish government retaliated by cutting all economic, political, and 
military ties with France.
151
 The Turkish ambassador was recalled to Ankara and France 
was banned from using Turkish military bases. Furthermore, Turkey accused France of 
committing genocide in Algeria during the war in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the 
negative consequences France faced after the December vote, the French Senate adopted 
the bill in January 2012. However, a month later, the French Constitutional Court found 
the measure unconstitutional and an attack on freedom of expression.
152
 
Some called the genocide denial law “France’s 301” because it had a similar 
effect as Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code.
153
 It constrained speech, but this was not 
the first time France or a European nation adopted a bill that criminalized genocide 
denial. A number of European countries have adopted laws that make the denial of the 
Holocaust illegal, and France is one of them. Thus, why did this particular bill garner so 
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much attention and criticism? The main reason is that the Holocaust has been recognized 
by Germany, whereas Turkey still denies the Armenian Genocide. It has directed its 
efforts into genocide denial and has threatened all governments that have attempted to 
recognize the Armenian Genocide officially, including the US, France, and even Sweden 
in 2010. Many in Turkey believe that the West uses genocide recognition as a political 
leverage, and Europe will never accept Turkey to the EU; the recognition is used to 
discourage Turkey from pursuing EU membership.
154
  
The European Parliament recognized the 1915-1917 events as genocide in 1987, 
but it acknowledged that the present-day republic could not be held responsible for the 
crimes of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Article 3 of the resolution called on the 
Council to attain Turkish government’s acknowledgement of the genocide.155 Although 
genocide recognition is not a precondition for Turkish accession to the EU, the European 
Parliament has been encouraging Turkey to face its history and allow people to openly 
inquire about the fate of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire.
156
  
Overall, Article 301 is not only a threat to Turkish citizens, but it is also affecting 
the global community. The punishment for foreign governments is not a prison sentence 
but has a similar effect. Turkey can sever diplomatic relations and cut down trade, hurting 
those who depend on it economically. However, without the US and Europe, Turkey will 
lose the power it has gained. Thus, the AKP government should acknowledge past history 
and follow a path of Westernization by implementing democratic reforms.  
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 Freedom of expression is a global issue that that has sprung up in various places 
for specific reasons. As understood from the Turkish case, the main goal of governments 
is to maintain power and territorial integrity. Consequently, some individual freedoms are 
denied and limited. This thesis addressed limitations on freedom of expression in Turkey 
to illustrate that this issue is affecting the global community as a whole. Turkey is not 
only censoring its own citizens but has also silenced foreign governments and is 
threatening human rights worldwide.  
 The Republic of Turkey has strived to become a regional power and serve as a 
link between the West and the East. It is also the first and only Muslim nation to be 
considered for European Union accession. Nevertheless, for the purpose of gaining the 
acceptance of Europe, Turkey needs to adopt EU’s values and respect human rights. In 
order to do this, “Turkey must take a brave step and come to terms with its own 
irrefutable historical record.”157 Since the Republic of Turkey does not want to be 
reminded of its predecessor’s mistakes and wrongdoings, it has adopted a policy of 
intolerance and strong nationalism.  
 To gain EU membership, it is imperative for Turkey to recognize minorities and 
allow an open discussion of the past. Without this, Turkey cannot be considered a true 
democracy and will never be accepted by the European community. Although the 
Turkish government has chosen to imprison those who address the Kurdish and 
Armenian issues rather than face the reality, the discourse on these topics is intensifying 
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and international pressure on Turkey to abolish controversial laws limiting freedoms 
continues.  
Numerous times, Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law 
have been enacted to silence journalists for the non-violent expression of their opinions. 
In September 2012, Turkey arrested more than 40 Kurdish journalists for their alleged 
support of the PKK.
158
 The government does not allow public discussion of Kurdish 
rights to self-determination and refuses to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide, and yet, 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was quick to denounce the Syrian 
government’s massacres of civilians as “attempted genocide.”159 Hypocrisy will not 
improve Turkey’s image internationally. Only by accepting past mistakes, abolishing 
laws that suppress freedom of expression and minority rights, and curtailing the power of 
the military, Turkey will achieve its goal of becoming a regional power and even a global 
political leader.  
 The Turkish Republic might be on the right track, as in the last year, it has 
rekindled reforms and is drafting a new constitution. This could be an opportune moment 
for Turkey to improve its human rights record and become a true democracy. This study 
only provides data on the possible reasons for limited speech and the results. Future 
research in this field should focus on the new changes that take place in the next year and 
the challenges that Turkish society will face as a consequence. Additionally, the 
examination of the role of the military and its diminishing power will improve the study 
further.  
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Appendix 
Definition of Terms 
 
Copenhagen Political Criteria – rules a country needs to meet in order to be eligible to 
join the European Union.  
Deep State – an alleged coalition within the Turkish political system generally comprised 
of individuals from the military, security forces, and intelligence agencies that carry their 
own political agenda and do not respond to the civilian government.   
Hrant Dink – Turkish-Armenian editor of Agos newspaper, assassinated in Turkey for 
writing about the Armenian Genocide.  
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – the founder and the first President of the Republic of Turkey.  
Orhan Pamuk – Turkish novelist and recipient of 2006 Nobel Prize in Literature. He was 
prosecuted under Article 301 for speaking about the Armenian and Kurdish issues.   
Ragip Zarakolu – Turkish publisher and human rights activist. He has faced prosecution 
for publishing about minority and human rights in Turkey.  
Taner Akçam – Turkish historian prosecuted for publicly acknowledging the Armenian 
Genocide.   
Treaty of Lausanne – a peace treaty signed on July 24, 1923 to end the war between 
Turkey and Europe. It established the current-day Turkish borders.  
Treaty of Sèvres – a peace treaty signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied 
Powers at the end of World War I. If ratified, it would have partitioned the Ottoman 
territory and create an independent Armenia and Kurdistan. The treaty was rejected by 
Turkish nationalists.  
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